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Abstract
The Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is a well-known standard protocol, mainly used for remotely accessing shell accounts on
Unix-like operating systems to perform administrative tasks. As a result, the SSH service has been an appealing target for
attackers, aiming to guess root passwords performing dictionary attacks or to directly exploit the service itself. To identify
such situations, this article addresses the detection of SSH anomalous connections from an intrusion detection perspective.
The main idea is to compare several strategies and approaches for a better detection of SSH-based attacks. To test the
classification performance of different classifiers and combinations of them, SSH data coming from a real-world honeynet
are gathered and analysed. For comparison purposes and to draw conclusions about data collection, both packet-based and
flow data are analysed. A wide range of classifiers and ensembles are applied to these data, as well as different validation
schemes for better analysis of the obtained results. The high-rate classification results lead to positive conclusions about the
identification of malicious SSH connections.
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1 Introduction
The Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is a standard application-layer (under the TCP/IP stack) protocol for
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of three major components:
• Transport Layer Protocol: it provides server authentication, confidentiality and integrity with
perfect forward secrecy.
• User Authentication Protocol: it authenticates the client to the server.
• Connection Protocol: it multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical channels.
The main usage of the SSH protocol is for remotely accessing shell accounts on Unix-like operating
systems. As a result, most of the tasks and activities performed over this protocol are related to
administrative purposes, such as user management, device configuration, permission assignment,
etc. For this reason, the SSH service has been for years an attractive target for attackers, as crucial
information travel over it. Intruders then try to guess passwords for malicious purposes, performing
dictionary attacks, or to directly exploit the service itself. Weak passwords are targeted as there is
no need for attackers to get the password of a root user account; there are many ways to increase the
privileges of a user once logged-in. Furthermore, getting SSH access to remote hosts may be one of
the first steps for further attacks over SSH tunnelling, such as SPAM sending.
Differentiating from other remote-communication protocols (File Transfer Protocol or Telnet),
SSH encrypts the login session as a prevention mechanism to avoid the collection of unencrypted
data (passwords and some other crucial data). Actually, SSH was conceived as a secure protocol to
replace previous unsecure solutions to run sessions on remote host. However, the SANS Institute’s
Internet Storm Center [24] keeps monitoring an average of 100,000 targets being attacked on SSH
default port number every day on Internet. From time to time, some attack peaks are produced, as
the one on March 2014 (8× baseline).
As a result of the above mentioned, being able to distinguish between malicious and benign SSH
traffic for server administration may play an indispensable role in defending system administrators
against malicious adversaries. This is one of the targets of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) [6, 7, 9],
which have become an essential asset in addition to the computer security infrastructure of most
organizations. In the context of computer networks, an IDS can roughly be defined as a tool designed
to detect suspicious patterns that may be related to a network or system attack. Intrusion detection (ID)
is therefore a field that focuses on the identification of attempted or ongoing attacks on a computer
system [host IDS (HIDS)] or network [network IDS (NIDS)]. While prevention mechanisms are
aimed at avoiding intrusions, ID relies on the idea that intrusions will succeed and then they must
be identified for security response. In this case, identification of SSH anomalous connections while
they are being run certainly is an important task as it may reduce the impact of attacks, thanks to
abortion mechanisms.
The aim of this study is to assess data collection, classifiers and ensembles in the useful task of
detecting bad-intentioned SSH connections. As a result, best practices for SSH connection filtering
may be proposed. To do so, real data, coming from the Euskalert honeynet [10], are gathered and
analysed as described in the remaining sections of the article.
A honeypot has no authorized function or productive value within the corporate network other
than to be explored, attacked or compromised [4]. Thus, a honeypot should not receive any traffic at
all. Any connection attempt with a honeypot is then an attack or attempt to compromise the device
or service that it is offering. From the security point of view, there is a great deal of information
that may be learnt from a honeypot about a hacker’s tools and methods to improve the protection
of information systems.
In a honeynet, all the traffic received by the sensors is suspicious by default. Thus, every packet
should be considered as an attack or at least as a piece of a multistep attack. But, in the case of
SSH, a honeynet also receives legitimate connections for the administration of the honeynet itself.
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As a result, for this study, data from ‘normal’ SSH connections are also available. Numerous studies
propose the use of honeypots to detect automatic large-scale attacks, honeyd [22] and nepenthes
[2] among others. The first Internet traffic monitors known as Network Telescopes, Black Holes or
Internet Sinks were presented by Moore et al. [21].
The Euskalert honeynet [16], whose SSH data are analysed in this article, has been monitoring
attacks against well-known services. A network of honeypots has been deployed in the Basque
Country (northern Spain), where eight companies and institutions have installed one of the project’s
sensors behind the firewalls of their corporate networks. The honeypot sensor transmits all the traffic
received to a database via a secure communication channel. These partners can consult information
relative to their sensor (after a login process) as well as general statistics in the project’s website.
Once the system is fully established, the information available can be used to analyse attacks suffered
by the honeynet at network and application level. Euskalert is a distributed honeypot network based
on a Honeynet GenIII architecture [11]. As previously mentioned, the Euskalert sensors have also
recorded the SSH sessions used to administer and maintain the different devices of the infrastructure.
ID has been previously approached from several different points of view; many different compu-
tational intelligence techniques—such as Genetic Programming [1], Data Mining [5, 12, 17], Expert
Systems [18], Fuzzy Logic [29] or Neural Networks [15, 25, 31] among others—together with statis-
tical [20] and signature verification [23] techniques have been applied mainly to perform a two-class
classification (normal/anomalous or intrusive/non-intrusive). More precisely, attacks to SSH service
have attracted researchers’ attention for a long time. Song et al. [28] analysed timing and keystroke
attacks. Researchers have also used honeypots to study and analyse attacks to this protocol, focusing
on login attempts and dictionary attacks [8, 19]. In Koniaris et al. [19], the authors analyse SSH
attacks on honeypots focusing on visualization of the gathered data.
Considering the data capture, as previously introduced, this study takes advantage of the Euskalert
project. Its data have been analysed and processed in different ways to determine the best approach
for the detection of SSH anomalous connections.
In this contribution, Section 2 presents the approaches under study, applied to the SSH data
described in Section 3. The experimental results are described in Section 4, while some conclusions
and lines of future work are introduced in Section 5.
2 Proposed approaches
Many different formulae could be applied for the detection of SSH-based attacks. This study analyses
some of them, based on three main stages:
1. Data collection: network data may be summarized in several different ways. In this work,
honeynet data are proposed to be collected at the packet level and as TCP flows.
2. Data analysis: several different classifiers and classifier ensembles are proposed as different
combinations for the modelling of SSH connections.
3. Result evaluation: there exist different cross-validation (CV) schemes to check the significance
of supervised classification results. In this work, 10K-fold and 5 × 2 CV have been applied.
Further details of the proposed approaches for each one of these stages are described in the following
sections.
2.1 Data collection
As previously mentioned, data from Euskalert honeynet regarding SSH sessions are targeted in this
work. Those data are proposed to be analysed in two different ways.
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TABLE 1. Collected features for SSH packets
Feature Description
Src IP address of the source host
Timestamp Daytime when the packet was sent
Size Size (number of bytes) of the packet
Numflags Amount of different flags used
TABLE 2. Collected features for SSH sessions
Feature Description
Src IP address of the source host
Length Duration of the session
Numpac Number of packets that the source host sent
Minlen Minimum size of the packets
Maxlen Maximum size of the packets
Size Average size of the packets
Numflags Amount of different flags used
First, data are collected at packet level. It means that the values in the headers at different layers
are extracted for further analysis. Table 1 shows the features considered for every single packet
targeting the honeynet address pool and SSH port.
Then, the traffic has been processed to obtain the SSH sessions out of the packets. The approach
for defining an SSH session was based on the TCP logic, using packets with the same source IP,
same destination IP and a common source and destination port. Source port is a non-privileged port
number that remains the same during any TCP session. The features that were extracted from each
one of the sessions in the data set are described in Table 2.
2.2 Data analysis
One of the most interesting features of IDSs would be their capability to automatically detect
whether a portion of the traffic circulating the network is an attack or normal traffic. This task is
more challenging when confronting brand-new bad-intentioned activities with no previous samples.
Automated learning models (classifiers) [3] are well-known algorithms designed specifically for
the purpose of deciding about previously unseen data. This issue makes them suitable for the IDS
task. Going one step further, ensemble methods [27] combine multiple algorithms into one usually
more accurate than the best of its components. Hence, the main idea behind ensemble learning
is to take advantage of classification algorithms diversity to face more complex data [26]. For this
reason, this study proposes the combination of classifiers to get more accurate results when detecting
anomalous and intrusive events.
A wide variety of automated learning techniques have been applied in this study to classify
SSH connections. Several base classifiers as well as different ways of combining them have been
considered for the analysis of Euskalert data. These base classifiers have been combined according to
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FIG. 1. The proposed two-stage method of validation.
the ensemble paradigm by the following strategies: Bagging, Boosting, Adaboost, MultiboostingAB
and Rotation Forest.
2.3 Validation schemes
For a more comprehensive study, two different CV schemes have been applied in this work, namely
10K-fold and 5 × 2 [30]. They are applied to check how suitable are the learning models for the
addressed problem (detection of SSH malicious connections). In case where the best model is found
for both CV schemes when applied to a certain data arrangement, it could be said that the classifier
and the ensemble are clearly the best ones.
To fulfil the requirements of the ID task, a two-stage process is proposed, as depicted in Figure 1.
The first stage was already discussed in González et al. [13] and was carried out by using the features
of the SSH sessions to test the classification performance of different classifiers and ensembles, by
means of WEKA software [14]. The best combination (with a classification rate of 100%) of a base
classifier and an ensemble was obtained by combining the decision table classifier and the Adaboost
ensemble.
Nevertheless, for real-life SSH ID it is important to take into account that the amount of training
data will always be smaller than the amount of data gathered when working on a real context. As
a consequence, the selection of data analysis models (both base classifier and ensemble) should be
assessed with a more realistic validation scheme. Thereby, a second stage has been accomplished
to assure that the chosen classifier may be applied in a real situation, where there are usually more
samples for testing than for training. In the second stage, proposed in this article, the base classifier
‘decision table’ is applied. This classifier has been trained again in combination with five different
ensembles for verifying that it is suitable for real data. For this new training, a 5 × 2 CV scheme
has being used. The new ensembles and validation schemas have been developed specifically.
3 Experimental validation on real data
The performance of the proposed approaches has been assessed using real data sets, coming from
the Euskalert project [10]. Detailed information about the data and the run experiments is provided
in this section.
The experimental study has been performed by extracting SSH data related to 34 months of real
attacks and administration tasks that reached the eight sensors of the Euskalert project. Data from
such a long time period guarantee that a broad variety of situations are considered. This honeynet
system receives 4000 packets a month on average.
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TABLE 3. Range of features for SSH packets
Feature Type Anomalous Administration
Src inet – –
Timestamp Time 00:00:02–23:58:20 00:02:40–23:09:37
Size Integer 40–220 40–380
Numflags Integer 2–194 2–24
TABLE 4. Range of features for SSH sessions
Feature Type Anomalous Administration
Src inet — —
Time Interval 00:00:00–352 days 09:48:19.891 00:00:00.004–519 days 18:24:05.446
Numpac Integer 1–95 1–23
Minlen Integer 40–64 40–380
Maxlen Integer 40–220 40–380
Avglen Numeric (8, 2) 40–96 40–380
Numflags Integer 1–6 1–4
The complete data set from Euskalert contains a total of 2,647,074 packets, including TCP, UDP
and ICMP traffic received by the distributed honeypot sensors. For this experiment, SSH data from
connections that happened between May 2008 and March 2011 have been selected. Additionally,
traffic containing real attacks to the SSH port and SSH connections to the system management port
have been filtered out. This way, system management traffic is considered as benign traffic, and SSH
connections coming from unknown IP sources are considered as malicious.
As stated in Section 2.1, two different data sets have been generated: the first data set contains
the packet-level data and amounts to 209 administration (legitimate) packets and 37,990 anomalous
packets. Table 3 shows the range of each selected feature (described in Table 1), depending on the
nature of the session (administration or anomalous).
Out of the packets, the session-based data set was also extracted, containing 82 administration
sessions and 8477 anomalous sessions. Table 4 shows the range of each feature, depending on the
nature of the session (administrator or attack).
4 Results
This section presents the results obtained by the different approaches proposed in this article. For
clarity and brevity, the average classification rate (%) for each ensemble applied to the n folders is
provided, together with the maximum value and the standard deviation in Tables 5 and 6. Figures 2
and 3 show the boxplots associated with the classification rates of the different ensembles when
applying the two alternative validation schemes. For independent analysis, classification rates for
both packet-based and TCP-sessions data sets are presented. The results are then discussed for each
one of the stages to which alternatives are proposed.
As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, the best-performance classifier in the different proposed alter-
natives is Bagging. Thus, Table 7 shows the confusion matrices for such ensemble. The amounts
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TABLE 5. Classification results from ensembles on packet-level data set
10K-fold 5 × 2 CV
No. Ensemble Average Max. Deviation Average Max. Deviation
1 Bagging 99.93 99.97 0.000474790 99.92 99.95 0.000158140
2 Boosting 99.83 99.97 0.000981427 99.79 99.87 0.000550786
3 Adaboost 99.83 99.95 0.000792667 99.78 99.90 0.000640341
4 MultiboostingAB 99.84 99.92 0.00646569 99.85 99.87 0.00022946
5 Rotation Forest 99.91 99.97 0.000413983 99.85 99.88 0.00017873
– Average 99.867 99.958 0.000661887 99.838 99.892 0.00035149
TABLE 6. Classification results from ensembles on session-based data set
10K-fold 5 × 2 CV
No. Ensemble Average Max. Deviation Average Max. Deviation
1 Bagging 99.82 100 0.00099298 99.74 99.84 0.0008003
2 Boosting 99.61 100 0.00270065 99.07 99.58 0.0035945
3 Adaboost 99.47 99.88 0.0022871 99.18 99.46 0.0029858
4 MultiboostingAB 99.46 99.65 0.00157671 99.32 99.51 0.0016225
5 Rotation Forest 99.72 100 0.00228562 99.58 99.70 0.0012137
– Average 99.616 99.907 0.001968612 99.378 99.617 0.00204341
FIG. 2. Boxplot results from ensembles on packet-level data set.
in this table are the cumulative results, according to the validation schemes (10K and 5 × 2). In
the case of the 10K folder scheme, data in confusion matrices are the sum of the results for the 10
folders. As each one of them applies to 10% of the data, the total amount of data is the size of the
data set (10 times 10%), i.e. 38,199 packets and 8559 sessions. On the other hand, for the 5 × 2
validation scheme, each folder comprises 50% of the data and there are 10 folders as well. Thus,
the matrices on the right side of Table 7 are related to 190,995 packets and 42,795 (10 times 50%).
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FIG. 3. Boxplot results from ensembles on session-based data set.
TABLE 7. Confusion matrix for the best results—Bagging ensemble
10 K-fold 5x2 CV
Output class Output class








































































(00.806%) (99.194%) (00.808%) (99.192%)
One of the main issues to be highlighted from Tables 5 and 6 is that Bagging is the ensemble
attaining the best performance in all cases (different data sets and validation schemes). Its average
classification rate (for the 10 classifiers) is always superior to that of other ensembles. Additionally,
the best classification rate (max.) for a single classifier is always one of the highest for such ensemble.
According to the data collection issue, it can be seen that classification results are on average (for
the different ensembles) higher in the case of packet-based SSH data set. Furthermore, the maximum
classification rates are also obtained for this data set, despite the fact that it reaches 100% for some
of the base classifiers combined with certain ensembles on session data set.
Through the evaluation by 10K versus 5 × 2, as shown in Tables 5 and 6, it can be said that 5 × 2
is more strict as the classification rates are always lower than in the case of 10K-fold (except for the
MultiboostingAB when applied to packet data set). However, for the best results (Table 7), it can
be said that false-negative rate (FNR) is lower for 5 × 2 in the case of SSH packet data set.
From Table 7, it can be said that false-positive rates (FPRs) and FNRs are good enough to validate
the proposed stages of SSH ID. The FNR reaches its lowest value (00.012%) when validating the
SSH session data set by 10K, as only one attack session is misclassified. In the case of packet-based
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data set, the FNR is lower for the 5 × 2 CV scheme. On the other hand, the FPR takes its lowest
value (00.028%) when validating the SSH packet data set by 10K.
5 Final conclusions
As the SSH is mainly used for administration purposes, and hence it manages critical information,
it is potentially a dangerous protocol. In this article, several strategies and approaches are compared
to validate its performance on the detection of SSH-based attacks.
The following main conclusions can be drawn from the proposed alternatives at the different ID
stages, according to the experimental results in previous section:
1. Data collection: by gathering data at the packet level, the obtained classification results are
better (on average) than those from session-based data.
2. Data analysis: Bagging is the ensemble attaining the best performance in all cases.
3. Result evaluation: 5 × 2 is more strict than 10K-fold.
The promising classification results obtained by ensemble classifiers in this study could be applied
to other network protocols and services. Mainly, it would be interesting its application to the
attacks received by the honeynets, such as those based on HTTP, SNMTP, or even FTP. Interesting
knowledge could be obtained from the honeypots classification models that will later prevent detected
attacks from surpassing the organization networks and causing any damage.
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